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EFFICIENCY IN SPANISH BANKING: A MULTISTAKEHOLDER APPROACH 
ANALYSIS 
Version: February 2014 
Abstract  
Searching for greater inter efficiency has been used as a reason to modify the Spanish banking 
system since 2009. This paper aims to contribute to quantify the magnitude of efficiency, but 
not only the economic one, but also social and overall efficiency from 2000 to 2011. The case 
of Spain -compared to other banking systems- provides unique information regarding the 
stakeholder governance banking literature because over the last century savings banks have 
become rooted in the Spanish culture. The results -confirmed by a two-stage frontiers 
analysis, a DEA and a model combined with bootstrapped tests- indicate that Spanish savings 
banks are not less efficient globally than banks and are more efficient socially. Moreover, our 
results–with potentially important implications- encourage the participation of stakeholders in 
banking systems and underline the importance of attaining long-term efficiency gains to 
support financial stability objectives. 
JEL classification: D21; G21; M14 
Keywords: Stakeholder Theory, Banking Governance, Social Efficiency, Banks, Savings 
Banks, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Bootstrap. 
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1. Introduction  
Since 2009, the Spanish financial system has undergone wide-ranging changes that have radi-
cally transformed it. One of the most affected financial institutions -by mergers and model 
transformation- has been saving banks, which represented, in 2010, more than 30% of total 
assets in banking system and more than 35% of market share (Asociación Española de Banca, 
2011).  
This type of financial institution is based, at least theoretically, on social issues. Saving banks 
aim to contribute to social and sustainable enlargement of the society and close environment 
but they have been questioned because of their lack of economic viability (Carbó et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the economic routine and public administrations have driven their transformation 
into traditional banking institutions. In fact, savings banks have been characterized as social-
ly-engaged financial institutions, but besides this differentiation, their maturity in terms of 
governance has been to avoid being governed by shareholders’ capital which has been one of 
their leitmotifs. Hence, in terms of models, traditional banks are, on the one hand, based on 
the property right model which establishes the capital as the key to governance. And on the 
other hand, savings banks are based on a multi-fiduciary model that takes into consideration 
not the capital as the element to determinate the governance of the institution, but other fea-
tures such as work, human resources or society decision legitimacy (García-Cestona and Sur-
roca, 2008; Boatright, 2008).  
Hence, an economic-social duality exists: banks are radically interested and oriented to eco-
nomic and financial results whereas basic aims of savings banks have to do with social issues. 
That’s the reason why it is questioned if they are different in terms of economic and social ef-
ficiency. In fact, the differentiation between these two efficiency measures could be used as 
the basic argument or contra-argument to develop a Spanish banking model without duality 
discrimination and maybe with another form to organize the decision-making system in bank-
ing governance. 
A substantial body of literature has emerged on bank efficiency (Fiordelisi, 2007; Hughes et 
al., 2003). Studies dealing with bank efficiency focus on methodological issues (e.g. Berger et 
al., 1993), estimating bank efficiency by focusing on countries differentiations (e.g. Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Chortareas et al., 2013; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Bec-
calli, 2004; Beccalli et al., 2006) or evaluating and analyzing the relationship between bank 
efficiency and shareholder value creation (Beccalli et al., 2006; Fiordelisi, 2007) and also fhe 
influence of central banks’ supervision (Gaganisa and Pasiouras, 2013). But, the most com-
mon element of bank efficiency literature is that it is focused on cost-benefit analysis. The 
findings are not conclusive probably because of the quantification of the efficiency based on 
costs (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Chortareas et al., 2013) instead of on other determinants 
(Berger and de Young, 2001; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006) that need to be recog-
nized explicitly in empirical models. Particularly, when financial institutions oriented to so-
cial value creation –such as savings banks- are analysed, social value outputs such as em-
ployment maintenance, taxes generated, credit invested in the real economy and funds 
destined to social foundations should be included as efficiency determinants. All these items 
have been taken into consideration in this paper.  
There is not a substantial body of literature relating to savings banks’ efficiency. Few studies 
deal with the measurement of the efficiency of entities that pursue alternative objectives (Ber-
ger and Humphrey, 1997; Carbó et al., 2002; Fiordelisi and Salvatore, 2013; Williams, 2004). 
However, it is highlighted by Altunbaş et al. (2001) the importance of the empirical studies in 
this research line because of the need to improve the knowledge about an efficient bank man-
agement model with earning and social capacity to be competitive. 
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As a continuation of the suggestion of these authors, but with the aim to make not only a con-
tribution to the empirical research of savings banks, but also to the development of the theory 
by means of explaining management efficiency, it is necessary to bring the multi-fiduciary 
theory to the fore. The main argument is the following one. This multi-fiduciary theory of 
stakeholder developed by Goodpaster (1991) and Boatright (2008) establishes the relationship 
between different stakeholders -not only shareholders- that are the principals and the agent -
that is the person with fiduciary responsibility behind the stakeholder group. Then, the agent 
will be legitimately obligated to respond to the interests of stakeholders. In this regard, other 
authors -such as Jensen (2002)- argue that it is not possible to manage the interest of all 
stakeholders because there is not a person with enough legitimacy to monitor the decision-
making agent because those that are the controllers (several stakeholders with autonomy) 
have dispersed or –even more- incompatible interests (in the scientific community it is called 
Jensen’s “problem of governance”). As a result, the effective power would be moved from the 
principal to the agent, who may act selfishly without any plausible control from the stake-
holders group. Under the assumption of this thesis, savings banks would have been worse 
managed in comparison to banks and, as a consequence, savings banks would be less efficient 
when measuring the relationship between used “inputs” and generate positive “outputs”. 
It is really very important the fact that –as far as we know- there are not any studies that have 
attempted specifically to bring together these two branches of literature by empirically analys-
ing the relationship between bank efficiency taking into consideration the bank type -banks 
versus savings banks- and economic-financial and social efficiency. Therefore, the aim of this 
study is to advance in the established literature by using a two-stage frontier analysis in order 
to show if the multi-fiduciary governance model in financial entities is confirmed by a signifi-
cant differentiation in terms of efficiency when comparing savings banks to banks (less effi-
ciency could be expected). The determinant type in Spanish bank is also evaluated by using 
the Tobit regression model approach (Casu & Molyneux, 2003; Harris, Huerta and Ngo, 
2013) in order to analyse the influence of this factor on bank efficiency. Following Casu and 
Molyneux (2003: 1866) “to overcome the problem of inherent dependency of DEA efficiency 
scores when used in regression analysis a bootstrapping technique is applied”1. This study 
aims to improve on the previous empirical literature by taking into consideration the types of 
financial institution and highlights not only economic efficiency but also the social one. Pre-
cisely, the lack of literature of social efficiency in banking does not permit us to develop a 
DEA network (Fare and Grosskopf, 2000; Fukuyama and Matousek, 2011) that potentially in-
creases the reliability of the input and output causal relationships because of in-deep shown 
model. However, it will not affect negatively the main objective of this paper, because of the 
basic model used represents independently but with factor relation different efficiencies. 
Then, three models are developed -economic, social and overall efficiency models- using the 
type of entity as external controller factor to analyze the discrimination between the models. 
Our data set consists of more than six-thousand bank and savings bank observations in Spain. 
The investigation period begins in 2000 and finishes in 2011. The efficiency of financial insti-
tution is measured by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and following a Tobit regres-
sion is applied. 
This paper contributes in three different ways to the existing literature regarding bank effi-
ciency in Spanish banking. First of all, unlike previous studies, our sample includes banking 
                                                          
1 Simar and Wilson (2007) demonstrated that conventional, likelihood-based approaches to inference are in-
valid, and developed a bootstrap approach that yields valid inference in the second-stage regression. In this paper 
the bootstrap is applied, but the censured model is used because the approach of this paper is to show the influ-
ence of the type, as it has been considered in the second-stage. As the comparison is made using the same regres-
sion, the result and contribution will not be affected by the regression used.  
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data from 2000 to 2011. Thus, data covers the period of financial banking crisis, which has 
increased pressures on financial entities to operate more efficiently. Secondly, while previous 
studies of this type mostly focus on economic efficiency (e.g., Berger et al., 1993) another 
important efficiency is estimated in this paper: the social one. Thirdly, the Spanish case pro-
vides unique information compared to other banking systems concerning stakeholder govern-
ance in the banking industry, because Spanish savings banks have been existing over the last 
century and have been quickly removed, moving from 19 in 2011 to 2 in 2012 (Caixa Ontiny-
ent and Caixa Pollensa are the only financial institutions that have been maintained legally as 
savings banks in Spain). 
Hence, the obtained results have potentially important implications in order to encourage mul-
ti-fiduciary participation of stakeholders in financial institutions. As the world financial mar-
ket is not perfectly competitive, banks will not be equally efficient regardless of their type. 
Thus, banks –that are based on property rights- are not necessarily more efficient overall, than 
saving banks –in which the participation of stakeholder is widespread. This might contribute 
to the development of the Spanish banking system in order to establish and strengthen collab-
orative and involvement practices of stakeholders to achieve not only economic but also so-
cial efficiency. 
The article is organized as follows: Section II reviews the previous literature on the relation-
ship between bank efficiency and stakeholder theory, taking into consideration the inclusion 
of savings bank during the analysed period of the Spanish financial system. Section III ex-
plains the Research Hypothesis to establish the basis of argument about the assumption made. 
Methodology, sample and input/output data used to measure bank efficiency are analysed in 
Section III. Thereafter, the empirical analysis results concerning banks and savings banks 
economic and social efficiency are shown and discussed -within the stakeholders’ participa-
tion engagement into banking governance- in Section V. Finally, Section VI ends with a con-
clusion and recommendations for further research. 
 
2. Literature review  
The fundamental approaches to the productive efficiency of banks are two; the non-structural 
understanding that considers the relations between performance indicators and the characteris-
tics of the governance, and the structural perspective, which presupposes theory option around 
the optimization concept. In concrete, the older bank efficiency literature applies the tradi-
tional microeconomic theory of production of non-financing companies to banking (Freixas 
and Rochet, 1997). It will be focused on technical efficiency. Recent works integrates the the-
ory of financial intermediation with the microeconomics of bank production (Hermes and 
Hong, 2010) and they are focused on economic efficiency (eg Hughes et al., 2003).  
Concerning the double orientation that is allowed by means of this technique –inputs or out-
puts-, some studies have chosen to reduce inputs (Berger and de Young, 2001; Williams, 
2004; Altunbaş et al., 2001) and other studies to reduce outputs (Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti, 2006; Salas and Saurina, 2003; Chortareas et al., 2013). However, it has been ques-
tioned if the assumption that profit maximization (and minimize costs) can be used as the sole 
criterion for the assessment of the outputs (Hughes, 1999, Hughes et al., 2003). The agency 
theory has marked the understanding of the management of corporations because of the agen-
cy cost that influences and determinates the objective of the entity, which necessarily is not 
directly related to the maximization of profit. In newer research (e.g., Hughes, 1999; Hughes 
et al., 2003) bank managers are modelled as maximizing their utility, which is a function of 
market value and risk. Continuing with this point of view the analysis of saving banks effi-
ciency requires the optimization of other outputs that differ from those of commercial banks 
that are focused on profits. Hence, these outputs must take into consideration other items apart 
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from banks profitability because of their specificities in their governance and socio-economic 
objectives (Carbó and Rodriguez, 2007; McKillop et al., 1996). 
Banks owned by shareholders pursue shareholder wealth maximization except to the extent 
that agency problem diverts the pursuit of this goal. In line with this approach, the status of 
non-profit Spanish saving banks and the various social welfare goals might be used to judge 
the performance of these financial institutions into bank efficiency model of managerial utility 
maximization. Literature in general has taken into consideration the efficiency from a narrow 
view point (Tortosa-Ausina et al., 2002); however, there is the point to establish broadly the 
efficiency taking into consideration the economic efficiency with the aim to establish the out-
puts as indicators measuring the social value.  
Another aspect mentioned in the literature has to do with the relationship between risk and ef-
ficiency, with an ambiguous result (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). In the last few years, different pa-
pers consider the need to introduce the risk factor regarding the analysis of banking efficiency 
(Berger and de Young, 2001; Hughes, 1999) and the contingency provisions (Altunbaş et al., 
2001). 
Concerning the inclusion of uncontrollable inputs, previous works such as Drake and Hall 
(2003) and Bos and Kool (2006), that follow the proposals made by Berger and Humphrey 
(1997), have found out that some factors such as environment, market specificity and the re-
gional macroeconomic reality can affect efficiency. A discussion is opened in this line, be-
cause Simar and Wilson (2007) give a solution and present a statistical model in order to 
make clear how environmental variables might be relevant and they also describe a bootstrap 
method. In our study one external uncontrollable variable is included as environmental factor: 
the type of entity; because it is expected that the decision process related to the multi-lateral 
representative governing bodies influences the efficiency in their different perspectives: social 
and economic one, but also overall efficiency. Moreover the robustness of this analysis has to 
do with the fact that what it is intended is a comparative analysis between two kinds of enti-
ties with a balanced distribution between them and a number of subjects superior or near to 
100 (depending on the year). Hence, the population is wide enough and heterogeneous and it 
will not be a bias in final results. In this regard, efficiency comparative analysis literature of 
different types of financial entities is limited, but there are relevant reference papers (Carbó et 
al, 2002; Williams, 2004), which results are debatable, though. Some authors consider that the 
different orientation that banking entities have regarding the achievement of profits might 
have derived into, on the one hand, a specialization of private banking in order to obtain more 
profitable customers and, on the other hand, savings banks and credit cooperatives have of-
fered specific products for low income families and small enterprises (Carbó and Rodriguez, 
2007; Fiordelisi and Salvatore, 2013; McKillop et al., 1996). This specialization in the orien-
tation means that the use of comparative analysis concerning the classic efficiency indicators, 
generated from the identification with productivity, is not completely adequate because of the 
lack of adequacy to the aims that are not exclusively oriented in economic terms.  
In the same line, Altunbaş et al. (2001) and Goddard et al. (2007) provide evidence that mutu-
al banks don’t aim to minimize costs or maximize profits and that private banks are not more 
efficient than any other kind of banking entity. Fiordelisi (2007), in a European level study, 
concludes that shareholder value efficiency in cooperative banking is 3% higher than the ob-
tained by commercial and saving banks. Nevertheless, these differences are not consistent in 
all countries because, on the one hand, in Italy this kind of efficiency is similar to all kinds of 
banking entities, and on the other hand, savings banks in Germany and France are, on aver-
age, less efficient than cooperatives and commercial banks. The interest in this topic and the 
consequent variability of results create more expectation and interest in the proposed work, 
because the expected results are wider. 
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In this context, there are studies that have analysed the situation of savings banks in Spain. 
Financial literature has studied these issues with a narrow view towards making a profit. 
Thus, Kumbhakar et al. (2008) studied the technical efficiency of Spanish savings banks dur-
ing the years 1986-1995 and concluded that it diminished over the period, even if they also 
found evidence of an increase in productivity in savings banks in Spain. Other authors like 
Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2002) have also studied the efficiency of Spanish savings banks, but for 
the years 1992-1998. They used the (frontier) DEA efficiency analysis technique. With regard 
to productivity rates, the conclusions that emerged from this study state that there is an in-
crease in productivity due to improved production possibilities. As for efficiency, they con-
cluded that the technical efficiency mean was very high and did not vary much throughout the 
period studied. However, it seems that there were significant differences among the banks. 
Their findings coincide with those obtained by Pastor (1995), but differ from those obtained 
by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1996) and Pestana et al. (2012); this is mainly due to the choice 
of different outputs and because of having studied a period different from the same sample.  
As it has already been mentioned, Spanish savings banks are a clear example of multi-
stakeholder orientation, although their foundation is indeed earlier than stakeholder theory 
formulation (Freeman, 1984). These entities are characterized by not being capitalistic enter-
prises, in fact, they are non-profit entities. Hence, savings banks are not oriented to create 
value for shareholders because, actually, owners do not exist. 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) proposes that organizations must try to create value in a 
balanced way for all the stakeholders of the organization. Somehow, this theory has been ap-
plied to business reality, up to the point that 76% of Fortune 500 enterprises propose, as one 
of its objectives, optimizing the interest for the group of stakeholders (Agle and Agle, 2007). 
Some scientists doubt about the applicability of the theory and propose it again. Goodpaster 
(1991), for instance, proposes an interesting paradox in terms of agency theory that consists in 
the following: if the agent favours the stakeholders’ interests in detriment of –or against the 
will of- the principal, the agent is, in fact, lacking fiduciary responsibility given by sharehold-
ers. In other words, Friedman (1970) argues that managers cannot use shareholders’ resources 
to develop Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) actions. As an answer to this objection, two 
clearly differentiated perspectives of stakeholder theory have been developed. The first one is 
denominated instrumental (Boatright, 2008) and is based on the consideration that generation 
of value for the group of stakeholders will have, as a final consequence, value creation for 
shareholders. Under this perspective, stakeholders are considered as a mean and not as an end 
by themselves. The second perspective, known as multi-fiduciary theory (Goodpaster, 1991; 
Boatright, 2008), argues that since fiduciary responsibility among the agent and shareholders 
is amplified to the rest of stakeholders, a reformulation regarding the agency theory is pro-
posed, that consists in amplifying the consideration as the principal of shareholders to all the 
group of stakeholders, in which shareholders are also included. This approach considers 
stakeholders as ends and not as means, and allows an interpretation of stakeholder theory as a 
firm theory –ontological view (Wieland, 2011; Retolaza, San-Jose & Ruiz-Roqueñi, 2014). 
Apart from legitimacy problems of this approach, Jensen (2002) highlights the “problem of 
governance” that could be summarized as follows: if some or the whole group of stakeholders 
of an organization is ascended to the principal category, principals will have divergent and 
even opposite interests; hence, an agreement to control the agent performance will be impos-
sible to be obtained. On the contrary, the agent will be the referee of this conflict of interests 
and the real decision-maker in the organization. Besides the fact that even nowadays the dis-
persion and divergence of interests among shareholders make –in many enterprises- very dif-
ficult for the principal to control the agent (Boatright, 2008), increasing the number of princi-
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pals by the inclusion of stakeholders –that can have extremely diverse interests- seems to 
complicate the problem considerably. 
In this sense, Spanish savings banks are a clearly multi-stakeholders oriented organization, 
defined by law and with an administration board represented by a wide number of groups of 
interest (García-Cestona and Surroca, 2008). Saving banks are, in fact, a real experiment 
about the practical viability of the multi-fiduciary stakeholder theory. 
 
3. Research Hypotheses  
The problem that concerns us is analysing whether there is evidence that multi-stakeholder 
governance adversely affects the efficiency of a financial institution. To solve it, we have re-
sorted to statistical hypothesis testing using the hypothetical-deductive method. Prior to this, 
we employed the synthetic analytical method to identify the components of the problem and 
to move them to a system of inputs and outputs. 
The fundamental hypothesis (H1) is founded on Jensen’s “problem of governance” (Jensen, 
2002). If it is right, the management efficiency of savings banks would be significantly inferi-
or to the one obtained by banking entities oriented to shareholders. Consequently, the funda-
mental hypothesis (H1) can be stated as follows: “There is a significant difference between 
savings banks and banks in relation with their overall efficiency”. To conduct a more exhaus-
tive analysis, this hypothesis is broken into another two hypotheses (sub-hypotheses). 
In fact, the own ideology of saving banks along with some studies have manifested that –
according to the multi-stakeholder objectives- economic efficiency is not the main aim of sav-
ing banks (Altunbaş et al., 2001; Goddard et al., 2007). Hence, the main efficiency hypothesis 
is explained using two hypotheses relative to the overall one, firstly, into a sub-hypothesis re-
garding the fact that banks are expected to have a higher economic efficiency than savings 
banks.   (H1a) “There is a significant difference between savings banks and banks in relation with 
their economic efficiency”. 
Simultaneously, as a consequence of their social aim and multi-stakeholder orientation, a 
higher social efficiency is expected for savings banks versus banks.   (H1b) “There is a significant difference between savings banks and banks in relation with 
their social efficiency”. 
As a consequence of the above, three technical models are shown in this paper relative to 
overall, economic and social efficiency in banking. The second stage of the analysis will re-
veal the influence of the governing body type into these three efficiency models and, conse-
quently, if Jensen’s “problem of governance” is confirmed, it is postulated that banks must 
have a higher global efficiency than saving banks, due to the residual loss generated by the 
own interest of managers. Therefore, if saving banks global efficiency is equal or higher than 
banks, it could be concluded that agent lack of control does not produce a residual loss for 
stakeholders as a group but at the most, a redistribution of the value created. 
 
4. Methodology, Sample and Input/Output Data 
Corporate finance literature determinates usually the company’s performance using account-
ing-based profitability measures, market-based ratios and cash flow-based measures (Beccalli 
et al., 2006). However, the efficiency method –which is more sophisticated since it is derived 
from firms’ inputs and outputs and because of the low possibility of manipulation in compari-
son to accounting ratios- is suitable to measure company’s performance (Charnes et al., 1978; 
Banker et al., 1984). Thereby, the frontier efficiency analysis is used in this paper, particularly 
because it is widely used in banking literature (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
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An abundance of studies analyse banking productivity from quantitative data, using both par-
ametric and non-parametric techniques (Berger et al., 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Nevertheless, in the last few years, a non-parametric technique called Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) has begun to be used to esteem the efficiency function that enables both a 
quantitative and qualitative output to be incorporated in the efficiency analysis (Berger et al., 
1993). This advantage added to the fact that it is not necessary to define in advance a produc-
tion function, has established DEA as the most used non-parametric technique in these kinds 
of investigations (Goddard et al., 2007). Some examples are Fiordelisi (2007), Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki et al. (2009), or Fiordelisi et al. (2011) that develop a comparative analysis of bank-
ing efficiency in EU countries; or, previously, Drake and Hall (2003) analyse Japanese bank-
ing efficiency. In particular, a non-parametric programming technique, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) is based on measuring relative efficiency, which traces back to Farrell 
(1957), who defines business efficiency considering multiple inputs. Specifically, efficiency 
is measured based on two basic components: technical and allocative efficiency, which com-
bined allows to measure economic efficiency (Berger et al., 1993). For the data return, Con-
stant Returns to Scale (CRS) of Charnes et al. (1978) has been used. 
The two-stage estimation procedures are commonly used in the existing literature. These pro-
cedures consists of estimating by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) estimators of technical 
efficiency, in the first stage, and the resulting efficiency estimators are regressed with some 
environmental variables, in the second stage. (Simar and Wilso, 2007 cited 48 papers that 
used this technique and the Google Scholar search engine returned about 840 articles after a 
search on “bank efficiency,” “two-stage,” and “DEA” on 21 February 2014). The second 
stage lies in the application of a Tobit censured regression combined with a bootstrap because 
of the presence of the inherent dependency among the efficiency scores and with the aim to 
reduce the inappropriative and misleading possible results because of the lack of independ-
ence within the sample. As noted by Xue and Harker (1999) and continuing with Casu and 
Molyneux (2003) and Simar and Wilson (2007) the application of bootstrapping technique 
could be appropriate to attempt to overcome this problem. 
 
Our data set consists of banks and savings banks from Spain since 2000 to 2011 (see Table 1) 
with financial information obtained from the Spanish Banking Association (Asociación Espa-
ñola de Banca, AEB) and the Anuario Estadístico de las Cajas de Ahorros, also since 2000 to 
2011 and published by the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (Confederación Española 
de Cajas de Ahorros, CECA). It should be noted that credit cooperatives have been excluded 
from the study; while they make for a highly interesting financial model, they represent an in-
termediate (multi-fiduciary) approach in terms of multi-fiduciary theory, so their possible re-
lationship with efficiency is not so clear when addressing Jensen’s “problem of governance”, 
the basic of this paper. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Frontier Analyst software has been used, which employs a scale of 100 and Stata is used to 
test the regression and to apply the bootstrap method. To the extent that a financial institution 
(considered as a DMU) is far from the frontier (which is determined by the group of decision-
making units that obtain maximum efficiency), the value will fall to between 100% and 0%. 
This method allows us to obtain relative, but not absolute, efficiency. In this way we obtain 
the most efficient DMUs compared with the selection under consideration, meaning that the 
units that are more efficient when compared with the others are identified. This analysis 
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works best when, as in our case, we can perform it over the entire population and not just a 
sample of it. 
Given that the DEA is based on a relationship between inputs and outputs, a challenge that 
applies in all studies of financial institution efficiency is the identification of inputs and out-
puts. In the existing literature four main approaches are used to develop bank efficiency mod-
el based on frontier analysis that influence in the selection of input and outputs: 1) the produc-
tion approach, 2) the intermediation approach, 3) the cost-revenue approach and 4) the value-
added approach. Firstly, under the production approach, one of the most used (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997), banks are focused on the services given to depositors and borrowers, 
(Hermes and Hong, 2010, Fiordesili et al., 2011); then, the main inputs are based on those of 
production, labour and capital and outputs are deposits and loans. Secondly, under the inter-
mediation approach, the aim of banks is to reduce transactional costs between depositors-
borrowers relationship, and the financial resources efficient utility is the base (Aly and 
Grabowski, 1990; Hermes and Hong, 2010); then, the main inputs are bank liabilities (i.e. de-
posits) and outputs are bank assets (i.e. loans). Thirdly, the cost-revenues approach -
considered as a more basic view point than previous approaches- focuses on the ability of 
banks to contribute the maximum banks’ net revenue (e.g. Goddard et al., 2007). Fourthly, the 
value-added approach is identified according to the value added relationship between bank 
variables (Berger and Humphrey, 1997); then, inputs are those variables that banks use to get 
some outputs, which are measured in value terms, and not on physical ones related directly to 
depositors and borrowers, as in the production approach. 
This article uses the value-added approach to develop bank economic and social efficiency in 
which bank resources and their utility are highlighted (Hermes and Hong, 2010) within value 
generation perspective. 
Bank efficiency is measured in this article using different input/output variables; specifically 
three models are estimated to measure economic, social and overall efficiency. The models 
have the same inputs but different outputs (see Table 2).  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Based on McGuire et al. (1988) and with the aim to control available funds included in the 
hypothesis related to the performance of corporations, three inputs need to be introduced: Eq-
uity, Total Assets and Deposits. The main reason is that although corporations “may wish to 
follow the normative rules of good corporate citizenship at all times, their actual behaviour 
may depend on the resources available” (Preston and O´Bannon, 1997: 423). Apart from the 
aim of the financial entity, the available resources -the inputs- are the variables that influence 
the bank efficiency and that determine banks’ performance. Inputs and obtained three models 
will show a significant comparison between efficiencies, being comprehensible the contrast of 
the models focused on overall, social and economic efficiency banking versions. These inputs 
guarantee the economic-financial equilibrium of financial entities, because of the sustainabil-
ity development of the resources and investments of banks, and this is the reason to maintain 
the same three inputs in the three contrasted models. 
Other variables based on cost efficiency could be integrated to establish the efficiency from 
the bank production theory perspective (from balance-sheet, for example: the quantity of non-
depositors borrowed funds, reserves, cash, and other liquid assets and off-balance-sheet finan-
cial services and products). But, the aim of the paper is to establish the bank efficiency com-
paring saving banks and non-saving banks considering various social welfare goals which 
might be used to judge the performance of these financial institutions and in an equilibrium 
form between inputs and outputs. 
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Specifically, deposits are resources managed by financial institutions. The relationship be-
tween deposits and the obtained outputs is part of the added-value generated by bank activity. 
Financial entities must optimize the use of deposits and that is the reason why it has been con-
sidered as an input and not an output variable. In other studies (e.g. Fiordesili, et al., 2011) 
deposits are used as outputs, but in this work the goal of the organization is not production or 
financial intermediation, but value added by entities. Moreover, the discussion of this paper, 
as we have already mentioned before, is to establish how to govern different types of financial 
institutions using efficiency as an indicator and not as an end, considering overall efficiency 
(defined as economic plus social efficiency). 
Outputs are distinguished by the treatment of economic, social or overall efficiency. The eco-
nomic efficiency is explained using the following outputs: results [profit-loss] and risk -
introduced by Hughes (1999), Sala and Saurina (2003) and Fiordesili et al. (2011). Risk –was 
obtained as the inverse of the summation of the contingent risks and commitments recognised 
by the different institutions- is incorporated by Fiordesili et al. (2011) previously and we 
thought it was relevant because it represents approximately the sum of recognized hazard by 
the entity. Moreover, in some papers (e.g. Hughes, 1999) efficiency is modelled with regards 
to utility maximization, which is a function of market value and risk that makes extend the ef-
ficiency function to the affected bank risk. This economic efficiency considers how well insti-
tutions turn a given amount of assets, equity, and deposits into profit and risk that is not exact-
ly a profit function but identifies best-practice performance of the banks in the Spanish 
sample based on value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) explained in the previ-
ous section. 
As for social efficiency, it was more difficult to identify possible outputs since there is no 
standardized system of indicators that measures social profitability or the profitability provid-
ed to other groups of stakeholders other than shareholders. The lack of literature in bank effi-
ciency in this regards has pros and cons; pros because of the novelty and innovative perspec-
tive of the paper and cons because of the effort to justify the objective selection of the 
indicators not being ad hoc. These outputs have been chosen with the aim to reflect the inter-
ests of the most important stakeholder groups: customers, employees and the community at 
large (Preston & O´Bannon, 1997). Then, credits because this balance-sheet variable is part of 
the social functions and reflect the provided loans to families and businesses (real economy). 
Lending contributes to social development. The type of credit to customers should be consid-
ered, but due to the lack of transparency of financial institutions this information is not avail-
able; as a consequence, both the analysis and results are more opaque (San-Jose et al., 2011). 
It is desirable but not possible to analyse the type of credit in depth; therefore it is considered 
as a whole in a positive way. Thus, labour (number of employees) is one of the main prob-
lems that citizens have; hence, employment creation is a social contribution. It reflects the in-
terests of the bank workers, then, it contributes to the social efficiency in a specific way. Gen-
erally, previous studies have considered labour as an input, but as this paper focuses on the 
social value created by two differently governed financial entities, this variable should be 
considered as a generated output. Social contribution (using taxes) represents money that fi-
nancial institutions pay back to society through tax administration or distribute it via social 
work in the case of savings banks case. This balance-sheet variable reflects the general inter-
est of the community. Finally, a fourth output has been introduced: risk. It is important be-
cause, as it can be seen in the results of the crisis in Spain, risk is transferred to society –in 
fact, the risk assumed by financial institutions can be quantified and currently the first bailout 
amounts to 40.000 million euro that has been transferred to third parties, in this case, the 
Spanish public system. Labour (number of employees) has been reduced drastically due to the 
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financial crisis and in 2013 the unemployment rate in Spain is 26% with no prediction to be-
ing reduced in the next two years. 
Overall efficiency includes the determinants used previously in social and economic efficien-
cy; thus, all previous outputs are introduced: results [profit-loss], risk, customer credit, labour, 
and social contribution.  
All this can be seen as algorithms (See Table 3). 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
Using the Data Envelopment analysis, in the first stage, and a regression combined with boot-
strap, in the second stage, with the sample of Spanish banks institutions we have obtained a 
comparison between the efficiency scores in the three levels for banks and savings banks. The 
efficiency scores for banks and savings banks on each of the three analyses (economic, social 
and overall) are shown in Table 4 for the period analysed (since 2000 to 2011). As expected, 
savings banks are less efficient economically but more efficient socially. The overall efficien-
cy shows considering overall input and outputs that –for most of the periods but not for all of 
them- savings banks are more efficient.  
 
[Insert here Table 4] 
 
Once the efficiency scores for each of the DMUs was obtained, a comparison of measure-
ments was made with the Tobit Regression combined with bootstrap (C=2000) the results ob-
tained appear in Table 5. 
 
[Insert here Table 5] 
 
There are significant differences, over the period 2000-2011 favourable to banks in relation 
with their economic efficiency. On the other hand, there is a significant difference favourable 
to savings banks in relation with their social efficiency, but only in 2001 and in 2002 and 
from 2008 to 2011. Finally, overall efficiency is favourable to savings banks, but it is not sig-
nificant.  
In summary, the results suggest about the previously developed hypotheses that:    “There is a significant difference between savings banks and banks in relation with their 
economic efficiency”.    “There is a significant difference between savings banks and banks in relation with their 
social efficiency”. At least in 2001 and in 2002 and from 2008 to 2011, years those corre-
spond to the crisis period.   “There is a significant difference between savings banks and banks in relation with their 
overall efficiency”. For overall efficiency, understood as a combination of economic and so-
cial efficiency input and outputs, we must uphold the null hypothesis, since no significant dif-
ferences were noted between banks and savings banks. 
Savings banks in Spain have been a significant financial actor, even to the point that its mar-
ket shared has historically been bigger than the one of banks. In this sense, we can affirm that 
it is not a residual phenomenon –like ethical banks in Spain or, in a lower measure, credit co-
operatives- but an agent similar to banks concerning importance and dimension. 
The comparison made in this paper with data of twelve years -from 2000-2007 (before the 
crisis) and 2008-2011 (fully immersed in crisis)- in terms of efficiency among banks and sav-
ings banks using the Spanish population and Data Envelopment Analysis followed by a Tobit 
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censured regression combined with bootstrap, leads us to determine that banks are more effi-
cient concerning the generation of economic outputs, but not concerning the generation of 
outputs that create socioeconomic value. These differences can be reasoned as a consequence 
of their different business model: banks are more oriented to economic results and savings 
banks are, in parallel, less alienated with these objectives but more oriented to social objec-
tives. Despite the reasonableness of this argument, results do not confirm this relationship, at 
least in a conclusive way, because only in 2001 and in 2002 and also since the financial crisis 
(2008 onwards) savings banks have obtained a higher social efficiency with significant statis-
tical support.  
Furthermore, efficiencies are relative and not absolute, hence, we cannot confirm that differ-
ence in social efficiency since 2008 exists due to an increase of efficiency of savings banks, 
that assume a more social role in periods of crisis; because it could also be explained as a de-
crease of social efficiency of banks, which in an unstable financial situation strengthen their 
alignment around their pure economic objectives motivated, probably, to ensure their continu-
ity.  
On the other hand, results refute Jensen’s “governance problem” hypothesis attributed to mul-
ti-fiduciary stakeholder theory. According to this hypothesis, it was expected that organiza-
tions with a wide diversity of interests and complexity in their control, such as savings banks, 
were significantly less efficient than banks. On the contrary, it is demonstrated that, if both 
economic and social outputs are considered, there is not a significant difference between these 
two kinds of entities. Although it is true that banks are more efficient economically –similar 
results are obtained by the bootstrap, the regression and the classical ANOVA-, this is con-
sistent with the fact that they are more oriented to shareholders; whereas savings banks are 
more oriented to a wide group of stakeholders and generate both economic and other kinds of 
return (outputs). The point that during years of bonanza (2003-2007) a significant difference 
did not exist in social efficiency between banks and savings banks could be explained by the 
fact that banks compensated the direct social contribution of saving banks by means of the 
payment of taxes to the administration in order to be redistributed. 
Likewise, saving banks have lasted more than one and a half centuries, had achieved a market 
share higher than 50% of the Spanish financial sector (35% in the last year of survival) and 
have obtained similar efficiency rates to the ones obtained by banks. Thus, savings banks are 
a clear example of the possible multi-fiduciary governance. Nevertheless, the fact that during 
the period of bonanza the economic efficiency of savings banks was clearly inferior and that 
their social efficiency was not higher, questions the model suitability concerning the objective 
generation of social value outputs.  
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we assess the efficiency of banking in Spain during the period 2000-2011 by us-
ing the frontier methodology combined with a bootstrap regression model. We delve more 
deeply into financial entities’ efficiency than previously by including several definitions of 
bank efficiency: overall, economic and social. We have also built on previous work by using 
banking data for different types of financial entities –banks and savings banks- before and 
during the financial crisis. It is shown the influence of governance based on stakeholders’ re-
sponsibility comparing the shareholder based model (banks) and the stakeholder based model 
(savings banks). This paper contributes to the debate about multi-fiduciary view of stakehold-
er theory using the analysis of savings bank efficiency. 
The findings of this paper are similar to those obtained by former European studies, and they 
suggest that European savings banks can be efficient –at least- as much as banks are. Moreo-
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ver the main finding seems to be the relationship between the bases of the financial entities 
analysed: shareholder versus stakeholder model.  
Several important and interesting findings are reported in this study. It appears that the stake-
holder model followed by savings banks in Spain is not a differentiation mark by which to 
base the different level of efficiency of different types of financial entities. There is little evi-
dence of any strong causal link between shareholder based financial institution model and 
their higher efficiency. What is more important, it reveals that the hypothesis of Jensen’s 
“problem of governance” is over assumed and –at least- there is a case in which a stakeholder 
based model (savings banks) is not less efficient than a shareholder based model (banks). 
In addition to the gains from building on previous work on the relationship between bank and 
savings bank efficiency, we believe that our empirical results are important from a stakehold-
er-based financial institution model. On the other hand, during the period of bonanza, the 
economic efficiency of those financial entities based on a stakeholder model (savings banks) 
was lower than those entities based on shareholder interests (banks) and the difference in 
terms of social efficiency was not fully significant. Hence, there is a demonstrated need to de-
velop a stakeholder-based financial institution model based on outputs that generate added so-
cial value. It is a good starting point for a future research in this research area. 
Moreover, we would like to point out that the research’s main limitations come, on the one 
hand, from the use of inputs and outputs related to social efficiency, because of the lack of lit-
erature on savings banks and the consequent lack of standardized indicators establishing the 
social mission of financial institutions; and, on the other hand, from the use of a censured 
model instead of a model based on a complete data-generating process (DGP) where second-
stage regression would be more appropriate. Then, probably with the approach of this paper 
the model will be ad hoc instead of structural; very sensitive to other structure for inputs, out-
puts, and environmental variables. Fortunately, it will not affect the contribution about Jen-
sen’s “problem of governance” because one model is enough to arise a reasonable doubt. 
 
  
15 
 
References 
Agle, B., Agle, L., 2007. The stated objectives of the Fortune 500: Examining the 
philosophical approaches that drive America’s largest firms. Working Paper, 
University of Pittsburgh. 
Altunbaş, Y., Gardener, E.P.M., Molyneux, P., Moore, B., 2001. Efficiency in European 
banking. European Economic Review 45 (10), 1931-1955. 
Aly, H. Y., Grabowski, R., 1990. Technical, scale, and allocative efficiencies in U.S. 
banking: an empirical investigation. The Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 
211–219. 
Asociación Española de Banca, 2000-2011. Anuario Estadísticio de la Banca en España, 
Diciembre 2000-2011, Ed. Asociación Española de Banca, Madrid.  
Pestana, C., Managi, S., Matousek, R., 2012. The technical efficiency of the Japanese 
banks: Non-radial directional performance measurement with undesirable output, 
Omega 40 (1), 1-8. 
Banker, R., Charnes, A., Coopers, W., 1984. Some models for estimating technical and 
scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis. Management Science 30 (9), 
1078-1092. 
Beccalli, E., 2004. Cross-country comparisons of efficiency: evidence from the UK and 
Italian investment firms. Journal of Banking & Finance 28, 1363–1383. 
Beccalli, E., Casu, B., Girardone, C., 2006. Efficiency and stock performance in European 
Banking. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 33, 218–235. 
Berger, A. N., Bonaccorsi di Patti, E., 2006. Capital structure and firm performance: A 
new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 30 (4), 1065-1102. 
Berger, A. N., de Young, R., 2001. The effect of geographic expansion on bank 
efficiency. Journal of Financial Service Research 19, 163–184. 
Berger, A. N., Hancock, D., Humphrey, D., 1993. Bank efficiency derived from the profit 
function. Journal of Banking & Finance 17 (2-3), 317–347. 
Berger, A. N., Humphrey, D., 1997. Efficiency of financial institutions: International 
survey and directions for future research. European Journal of Operational 
Research 98, 175–212. 
Boatright, J., 2008. Ethics in Finance. Blackwell, Malden (first edition 1999). 
Bos, J.W.B., Kool, C.J.M., 2006. Bank efficiency: The role of bank strategy and local 
market conditions. Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (7), 1953-1974. 
Canhoto, A., Dermine, J., 2003. A note on banking efficiency in Portugal, New vs. Old 
banks. Journal of Banking & Finance 27, 2087-2098. 
Carbó, S., Gardener, E.P.M., Williams, J., 2002. Efficiency in Banking: Empirical 
Evidence from the Savings Banks Sector. The Manchester School 70 (2), 204–228. 
Carbó, S., Rodríguez, F., 2007. The determinants of bank margins in European banking. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 2043-2063. 
Casu, B., Molyneux, P. 2003. A comparative study of efficiency in European banking, 
Applied Economics 35 (17): 1865-1876. 
CECA, 2000-2011. Anuario Estadístico de las Cajas de Ahorros, 2000-2011. 
Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, Madrid. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W., Rhodes, E., 1978. Measuring the efficiency of decision making 
unit. European Journal of Operational Research 2, 429-444. 
Chortareas, G.E., Girardone, C., Ventouri, A., 2013. Financial freedom and bank 
efficiency: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37 
(4), 1223–1231. 
16 
 
Dietsch, M., Lozano-Vivas, A., 2000. How the environment determines banking 
efficiency: A comparison between French and Spanish industries. Journal of 
Banking & Finance 24, 985–1004. 
Drake, L., Hall, M.J.B., 2003. Efficiency in Japanese banking: An empirical analysis. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 27, 891-917. 
Fare, R., Grosskopf, S. 2000. Network DEA, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 34, 35-
49.  
Farrell, J., 1957. The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society 120, 253-281. 
Fiordelisi, F., Marques-Ibanez, D., Molyneux, P., 2011. Efficiency and risk in European 
banking. Journal of Banking & Finance 35, 1315-1326. 
Fiordelisi, F., Salvatore, D. 2013. Probability of default and efficiency in cooperative 
banking, International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 26, 30-45. 
Freeman, R., 1984. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Pitman, Boston. 
Freixas, X., Rochet, J.C. 1997. Microeconomics of Banking, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Fukuyama, H., Matousek, R. 2011. Efficiency of Turkish banking: Two-stage network 
system. Variable returns to scale model, International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money 21, 75–91.  
Gaganisa, C., Pasiouras, F., 2013. Financial supervision regimes and bank efficiency: 
International evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance, forthcoming. 
García-Cestona, M., Surroca, J., 2008. Multiple goals and ownership structure: Effects on 
the performance of Spanish savings banks. European Journal of Operational 
Research 187 (2), 582-599. 
Goddard, J., Molyneux, P., Wilson, J.O.S., Tavakoli, M., 2007. European banking: An 
overview. Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 1911-1935. 
Goodpaster, K., 1991. Business ethic and stakeholder analysis. Business Ethics Quarterly 
1 (1), 53-73. 
Grifell-Tatjé, E., Lovell, C., 1996. Deregulation and productivity decline: The case of 
Spanish savings banks. European Economic Review 40 (6), 1281-1303. 
Hughes, J.P., 1999. Incorporating risk into the analysis of production, presidential address 
to the Atlantic Economic Society. Atlantic Economic Journal 27, 1-23. 
Hughes, J.P., Lang, W., Mester, L.J., Moon C.-G., Pagano, M. 2003. Do bankers sacrifice 
value to build empires? Managerial incentives, industry consolidation, and 
financial performance, Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 417-447. 
Jensen, M., 2002. Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective 
function. Business Ethics Quarterly 12 (3), 235-256. 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, A., Margaritis, D., Staikouras, C., 2009. Efficiency and 
productivity growth in the banking industry of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal 
of Banking & Finance 33, 557-467. 
Kumbhakar, S., Lozano-Vivas, A., Knox, C., Hasan, I., 2001. The effects of deregulation 
on the performance of financial institutions: The case of Spanish savings banks. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 33 (1), 101-120. 
Lozano-Vivas, A., Pasiouras, F., 2010. The impact of non-traditional activities on the 
estimation of bank efficiency: International evidence. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 34, 1436–1449. 
McGuire, J.B., Sundgren, A., Schneeweis, T. 1988. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
firm financial performance. Academy of Management Journal 31, 854-872. 
McKillop, D.G., Glass, J.C., Morikawa, Y., 1996. The composite cost function and 
efficiency in giant Japanese banks. Journal of Banking & Finance 20, 1651–1671. 
17 
 
Pastor, J., 1995. Eficiencia, cambio productivo y cambio técnico en los bancos y cajas de 
ahorro españolas: un análisis de la frontera no paramétrico. Revista Española de 
Economía 12 (1), 35–73. 
Preston, L.E., O’Bannon, D.P., 1997. The Corporate Social-Financial Performance 
Relationship: A Typology and Analysis. Business and Society 36, 419–429. 
Retolaza, J.L., San-Jose, L., Ruiz-Roqueñi, M., 2014. Ontological Stakeholder View: An 
Innovative Proposition, Global Business Review 15 (1): 25-36. 
Salas, V., Saurina, J., 2003. Deregulation, market power and risk behaviour in Spanish 
banks. European Economic Review 47, 1061-1075. 
San-Jose, L., Retolaza, J.L., Gutierrez-Goiria, J., 2011. Are ethical banks different? A 
comparative analysis using the radical affinity index. Journal of Business Ethics 
100 (1), 151-173. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P.W. 2007. Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-parametric 
models of production processes, Journal of Econometrics 136: 31–64. 
Simar, L., Wilson, P.W. 2011. Two-stage DEA: caveat emptor, Journal of Productivity 
Analysis 36:205–218. 
Tortosa-Ausina, E., Grifell-Tatjé, E., Armero, C., Cones, D., 2002. Sensitivity analysis of 
efficiency and Malmquist productivity indices: An application to Spanish savings 
banks. European Journal of Operational Research 184 (3), 1062-1084. 
Wieland, J., 2011. The Firm as a Nexus of Stakeholders: Stakeholder Management and 
Theory of the Firm. In: A. Brink. (Ed.), Corporate Governance and Business 
Ethics, Springer, Netherlands. 
Williams, J., 2004. Determining management behaviour in European banking. Journal of 
Banking & Finance 28, 2427-2460. 
Xue, M. and Harker, P. T. 1999. Overcoming the inherent dependency of dea efficiency 
scores: a bootstrap approach, Working paper 99–17, Financial Institution Center, 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
(http://www.wharton.upenn.edu). 
 
  
18 
 
Table 1. Data Sheet. 
VARIABLES  
Sample: Population 
Country: Spain 
Data: 2000-2011 
Database: AEB & CECA 
DMU: Financial Institutions: banks and saving banks 
Observations: 6000 
Method: Frontier. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Program: Frontier Analysis 4/STATA 
Execution: From November 2013 to February 2014 
Statistics: Bootstrap Tobit Regression 
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Table 2. Inputs and outputs of Overall, Social and Economic Efficiency: the Spanish banks 
vs. saving banks efficiency model. 
 
 INPUTS OUTPUTS 
Overall Efficiency (OE) Equity (E) 
Total Assets (TA) 
Deposits (D) 
Profit (P) 
Loss (L) 
Customer credit (CC) 
Jobs (J) 
Risk (R) 
Social Contribution (SC) 
Social Efficiency (SE) Equity (E) 
Total Assets (TA) 
Deposits (D) 
Customer credit (CC) 
Jobs (J) 
Risk (R) 
Social Contribution (SC) 
Economic Efficiency (EE) Equity (E) 
Total Assets (TA) 
Deposits (D) 
Profit (P) 
Loss (L) 
Risk (R) 
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Table 3. DEA Algorithms for CRS using banks and savings banks as DMUs. 
 
K homogeneous DMU (savings banks and banks) represented by: k (k=l,…,K). 
N: inputs (E, TA, D) (see Table 2) ~ Xjk (j=1,…., n) 
M: outputs (P, L, R for economic efficiency; CC, J, R, SC for social efficiency and P, L, CC, J, R, SC for 
overall efficiency) ~ Yik (i= 1,..., m) 
 
 
To select optimal weights the following mathematical programming is specified: 
 
The aim: Max. ܶܧ௞.   Subject to: 
and 
The above model shows CRS if w = 0. 
 
  
 
 
 
21 
 
Table 4. Overall, Social and Economic Efficiency Mean and Standard Deviation. Data En-
veloped Analysis from 2000 to 2011. 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Entities 
Mean
(σ) 
Mean 
(σ) 
Mean 
(σ) 
Mean
(σ) 
Mean
(σ) 
Mean
(σ) 
Mean
(σ) 
Mean
(σ) 
Mean
(σ) 
Mean 
(σ) 
Mean 
(σ) 
Mean
(σ) 
O
ve
ra
ll
 
E
ff
ic
ie
nc
y Savings 
Bank 
78.02 
(11.68) 
78.80 
(12.98) 
79.56 
(10.68) 
78.90 
(9.78)
83.46 
(9.04)
82.92 
(9.30)
84.90 
(8.74)
84.83 
(7.25)
82.98 
(7.49)
83.82 
(7.92) 
87.46 
(8.61) 
81.06 
(12.70)
Banks 
77.55 
(24.20) 
75.48 
(26.00) 
77.27 
(23.09) 
79.47 
(21.72)
81.11 
(23.31)
81.43 
(21.43)
86.61 
(18.05)
85.65 
(18.76)
81.28 
(20.23)
79.91 
(23.53) 
83.20 
(20.90) 
76.03 
(25.31)
S
oc
ia
l 
E
ff
ic
ie
nc
y Savings 
Bank 
77.89 
(11.51) 
78.50 
(13.05) 
79.40 
(10.65) 
78.50 
(9.27)
82.19 
(8.83)
82.55 
(8.92)
84.04 
(8.02)
84.34 
(6.97)
82.79 
(7.58)
82.54 
(8.02) 
86.64 
(8.68) 
80.58 
(12.61)
Banks 
74,85 
(24.97) 
71.45 
(27.41) 
72.30 
(25.67) 
75.13 
(24.10)
77.36 
(25.48)
77.50 
(25.53)
83.29 
(20.69)
81.57 
(23.17)
75.48 
(25.44)
74.46 
(27.09) 
75.13 
(27.22) 
67.28 
(28.80)
E
co
no
m
ic
 
E
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
Savings 
Bank 
3.91 
(6.61)
15.60 
(12.47) 
29.14 
(13.24) 
17.51 
(14.04)
15.65 
(14.33)
12.50 
(21.84)
25.66 
(13.51)
31.33 
(13.17)
19.29 
(15.95)
21.96 
(18.62) 
23.09 
(19.58) 
14.66 
(20.04)
Banks 
18.85 
(26.73) 
27.06 
(29.62) 
45.98 
(35.31) 
39.15 
(34.57)
34.45 
(33.39)
32.19 
(34.52)
48.92 
(29.90)
50.58 
(29.33)
36.12 
(33.98)
35.26 
(34.07) 
36.85 
(37.45) 
39.79 
(34.34)
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Table 5. Overall, Economic and Social Efficiency: bootstrap Tobit regression analysis us-
ing Type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years /Dependent Vari-
ables 
Overall Ef-
ficiency 
β; t valuep 
Social Effi-
ciency 
β; t valuep 
Economic 
Efficiency 
β; t valuep 
TYPE2000 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.02 
0.14 
12.67*** 
116 
0.81 
0.90 
11.69 
116 
19.17*** 
-4.38*** 
5.09*** 
116 
TYPE2001  Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.94 
0.97 
11.98** 
128 
3.19** 
1.98** 
10.24*** 
128 
9.01** 
-3.00** 
5.61*** 
128 
TYPE2002  Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.53 
0.73 
13.25*** 
119 
4.45** 
2.11** 
10.57*** 
119 
14.43*** 
-3.80*** 
7.58*** 
119 
TYPE2003 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.03 
0.18 
14.31*** 
112 
1.09 
1.05 
11.96*** 
112 
22.04 
-4.70*** 
7.12*** 
112 
TYPE2004  Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.57 
0.76 
13.53*** 
112 
1.94 
1.39 
11.08*** 
112 
13.07*** 
-3.62*** 
5.68*** 
112 
TYPE2005 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.24 
0.49 
14.36*** 
106 
2.02 
1.42 
10.80*** 
106 
12.06*** 
-3.47*** 
5.40*** 
106 
TYPE2006 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.41 
0.64 
18.20*** 
105 
0.07 
0.26 
15.17*** 
105 
27.50*** 
-5.24*** 
8.92*** 
105 
TYPE2007 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.09 
0.30 
17.37*** 
104 
0.76 
0.88 
12.96*** 
104 
19.38*** 
-4.51*** 
8.76*** 
104 
TYPE2008 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
0.34 
0.52 
14.42*** 
101 
4.13** 
2.03** 
9.89*** 
101 
7.71*** 
-2.78*** 
4.82*** 
101 
TYPE2009 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
1.38 
1.17 
12.06 
101 
4.78*** 
2.19** 
9.32*** 
101 
2.71* 
-1.65* 
3.73*** 
101 
TYPE2010 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
1.8 
1.39 
13.59*** 
91 
8.87*** 
2.98*** 
8.72*** 
91 
5.46** 
-2.34** 
4.88*** 
91 
TYPE2011 Wald Chi 
Type 
Constant 
Observations 
1.22 
1.10 
9.45*** 
72 
7.16*** 
2.68*** 
6.37*** 
72 
13.01*** 
-3.61*** 
5.67*** 
72 
23 
 
1 Constant= constant term. 
2 Continuing Simar and Wilson (2007, 2011) it has been used 2000 bootstrap replications for the confidence 
intervals of the estimated coefficients. However, we have not used a complete data-generating process because 
of the lack of uncontrolled variables and the lack of literature about the approach of the used model. 
3 Significance intervals 
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals. 
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals. 
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals. 
4 It has previously been used an ANOVA analysis which results (p-value probability) show that the H1a and 
H1b are not rejected; but H1 hypothesis has been rejected because the probability is lower than the significance 
level. Moreover, Levene-test is significant at 1% for overall, social and economic efficiency during the period 
from 2000 to 2011; then, the sample in overall period is free from homoscedascity assumptions and it is statisti-
cal possible to use F-test to compare means. 
 
